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QuALIFIED: MEDICAID PROVIDER 
AGREEMENTS, WAIVERS, AND THE POLITICS 
OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
Morgan Handley* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the last decade, a growing minority of Americans have come to favor "de funding" 
Planned Parenthood, which provides family planning care to millions of Americans 
through Medicaid at over 800 locations. Planned Parenthood also provides abortions 
with private funds. Following budget fights in 2011 and two rounds of doctored 
"undercover sting" videos in 2011 and 2015, several states have undertaken to bar 
entities that provide abortion care, including Planned Parenthood, from contracting 
as Medicaid providers. In 2012, Texas chose to forego $35 million annually in federal 
Medicaid funds in order to advance its agenda to "defund" Planned Parenthood. With 
the Department of Health and Human Services under new political management, the 
state now requests that federal funding be restored on the very terms that caused it to be 
terminated in 2012: the exclusion of abortion providers. 
This note examines the permissibility of categorical bars on certain types of family 
planning providers under existing federal Medicaid law in both traditional Medicaid 
and discretionary expanded family planning programs, with a case-specific examination 
of Texas s efforts to remove Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid operations. 
This note argues that it is illegal to enforce abortion provider contract bans within 
traditional Medicaid, and the violation of federal law may not be waived. As a result, 
Texas spending request to expand family planning benefits with the provider ban in 
place should be denied. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Social Security Act (SSA), which contains federal Medicaid law, provides 
that Medicaid beneficiaries may access covered services from any provider who is 
qualified and willing to offer the necessary care. 1 This mandate is commonly known 
as the free choice of provider provision.2 As the participation of Planned Parenthood 
affiliated clinics as providers of government-financed health care, such as Medicaid 
family planning services, became increasingly controversial, several states sought 
to bar entities providing abortion care and their affiliates from contracting with and 
receiving funds from the state governments.3 In effect, these states are attempting to bar 
politically disfavored providers from contracting as Medicaid providers, which reduces 
patient choice.4 The states urge that their contract bans do not violate the free choice 
provision, but are a proper exercise of state authority to define the term "qualified" for 
the purposes Medicaid to exclude abortion providers and their affiliates.5 However, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which supervises Medicaid at the 
federal level, has historically viewed these laws as in direct conflict with the free choice 
provision.6 Every court to reach the merits of a challenge to the state law contract bans 
or terminations of provider contracts for similar reasons under traditional Medicaid has 
enjoined the removal of providers on the grounds that they run afoul of free choice. 7 
1 Social Security Act, 42 US.C § 1396a(a)(23) (2012). 
2 See Letter from Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs. Director Vikki Wachino to State Medicaid 
Directors, Re: Clarifying Free Choice of Provider Requirement in Conjunction with State Authority 
to Take Action Against Medicaid Providers, State Medicaid Director Letter# 16-005 (Apr. 19, 2016) 
[hereinafter Clarifying Free Choice] https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/dmvnloads/ 
smdl6005.pdf 
3 See Tex. Hum. Res. Code§ 32.024(c-1) (2017) (instructing the Commissioner of the Texas Health 
and Human Services Commission to ensure that no funds from a family planning demonstration 
project are dispensed to entities that provide abortions or their affiliates); see also Burns Ind. 
Code Ami. § 5-22-17-5.5 (2011) (prohibiting all state agencies from entering into contracts 
with or awarding grants to any entity that provides abortions); see also Fla. Stat§ 390.0111(15) 
(2018) (prohibiting state and local agencies and managed care entities from contracting with or 
making payments to clinics licensed to perform abortions); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat § 35-196.05 
(2012) (forbidding state agencies from entering into contracts with or awarding grants to abortion 
providers); see also Alexandra Zavis, De fund Planned Parenthood Has Gained Momentum: Texas 
Shows How Extensive the Effects Can Be, LA TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-texas-planned-parenthood-20170530-story.htmL 
4 See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2013), Planned 
Parenthood ofind., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F3d 962, 978 (7th Cir. 
2012), Complaint at iJ 19, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62). 
5 See Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Missouri v. Andersen, 882 F3d 1205, 1230 (10th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 2018 WL 1456394 (2018); see also Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast v. Gee, 
862 F3d 445, 465 (5th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 139 S. Ct 408 (2018); Planned Parenthood Ariz., 
Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood oflnd., Inc. v. Comm'r of the 
Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F3d 962, 980 (7th Cir. 2012). 
6 See Clarifying Free Choice, supra note 2. 
7 See Andersen, 882 F3d at 1230; see also Gee, 862 F3d at 465; Betlach, 727 F3d at 969; Planned 
Parenthood Ind, 699 F3d at 980. 
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In 2012, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) ended an expanded 
discretionary family planning program in Texas after the state insisted on enforcing 
its contract ban in the event of renewal. 8 CMS took the position that allowing Texas to 
enforce the ban would be inconsistent with the requirements of the expanded programs, 
and subsequently terminated similar programs for the same reasons. 9 These expanded 
family planning programs, or "Waivers," were an exercise of the Secretary's authority 
under§ 1115 of the SSA to waive certain provisions of the law and create demonstration 
projects when the Waivers are considered likely to promote the objectives of the Act. 10 
After self-funding a replacement program on its own terms, Texas seeks authorization to 
create a new Waiver under § 1115 that is substantially similar to the terminated Waiver 
and would enforce the contract ban. 11 While federal law on this issue remains unchanged 
since the termination of Texas's first Waiver, CMS rescinded guidance interpreting 
the free choice provision to bar the contract bans in 2018. 12 The letter advised that 
"qualified" could not be construed to exclude providers on political grounds "unrelated 
to their fitness to perform covered services or the adequacy of their billing practices."13 
This Note argues that states may not use laws purporting to limit contract eligibility 
to redefine the term "qualified" to suit their political purposes and that such contract 
bans are a violation of the free choice provision that may not be waived under the 
Secretary's§ 1115 authority. 14 Part II of this Note explores Texas's ongoing efforts to 
remove Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid operations. 15 Part III provides a global 
review of Medicaid family planning policy, and Part IV explores the parameters of the 
8 See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHlP Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., to Kay Ghahremani, Comm'r, Tex. Medicaid & CHIP (Nov. 7, 2012). 
9 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Missouri Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet, 
Missouri Women's Health Services (Oct. 6, 2017) (stating that the program was terminated effective 
March 6, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/ 
Waivers/1115/downloads/mo/mo-health-services-program-fs.pdf; see also Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet, Iowa Family Planning Network 
(Jan. 2, 2018) (announcing that the program was terminated effective June 30, 2017), https://www. 
medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/ downloads/ia/ia-
fami:ly-planni:ng-network-fs. pdf. 
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012); see also State Waivers List, MEDICAID.Gov, https://www.medicaid. 
gov/medi:caid/section-1115-demo/demonstration-and-waiver-list/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018) (stating that programs authorized under§§ 1915(b) and 1915(c) are also known as Waivers). 
11 Marissa Evans, Texas Wants to Renew Federal Women :S Health Funding ft Lost Over Planned 
Parenthood, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (May 16, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/20 l 7 /05/16/womens-
health-programs-saw-sharp-decline-clients/. 
12 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, State Medicaid Director Letter# 18-003, Re: 
Rescinding SMD #16-005 (Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Rescinding SMD] https://www.medicaid.gov/ 
federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smdl8003.pdf. 
13 Id. 
14 See Part VI (outlining limits on § 1115 authority and arguing that free choice may not be 
waived to exclude politically disfavored providers). 
15 See Part II (explaining Texas' histmy of efforts to remove abortion providers from Medicaid 
family planning programs and state equivalents). 
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free choice provision in depth. 16 Part V asserts that barring Planned Parenthood from 
holding Medicaid provider contracts or terminating Planned Parenthood contracts on 
political grounds is a violation of the free choice provision. 17 Finally, Part VI concludes 
that the violation described in Part V may not be waived by the Secretary under his § 
1115 authority. 18 
II. PROVIDER POLITICS: A TEXAN CASE STUDY IN PUTTING 
IDEOLOGY OVER CARE 
From 2007 to 2012, Texas operated a family planning Waiver, which offered Medicaid 
family planning benefits to those not otherwise eligible for Medicaid pursuant to 
§ 1115(a)(2).19 Texas offers Medicaid to pregnant women up to 203% of the federal 
poverty level, which is an annual calculation of the highest income at which the federal 
government considers a person or family to be living in poverty; however, childless adults 
without a qualifying disability are not eligible for Medicaid. 20 Parents of minor children 
emolled in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) must have incomes below 
18% of the federal poverty level to receive benefits.21 The terminated Waiver, entitled 
the Texas Women's Health Waiver, offered family planning benefits to individuals up 
to 185% of the federal poverty line.22 The Waiver program provided family planning 
benefits, but not the full spectrum of Medicaid benefits.23 The Expenditure Authority, 
which authorizes states to claim federal reimbursement under Medicaid for the costs 
of their Waiver programs, was set to expire on December 31, 2011. 24 The Expenditure 
Authority was briefly extended to allow for renewal negotiations and to facilitate the 
transition from the federally- funded program under Medicaid to an independent state-
Part rn (describing the three modalities of Medicaid family planning). 16 See 
17 See Part V (arguing that excluding abortion providers from Medicaid is a violation of the 
free choice provision) 
18 See Part VI (concluding that the violation of free choice is not within the discretionary 
waiver authority of the Secretary) 
19 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Expenditure Authority No. l l-W-00232/6, Texas 
Women's Health Waiver (2006) [hereinafter Texas https://www.medicaid. 
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/ l l l 5/dow11loads/tx1Womens-Health-
Waiver/tx-womens-health-waiver-expnditme-auth-12302006- l 2312011.pdf 
20 See Medicaid and CHIP Pregnant Women Planning 
Programs, KAISER FAM. FouNo. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-and-
CHIP-Eligibility-as-of-Jan-2017-Table-4. 
21 See id 
22 See id; see also Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., l 115(a) Research and Demonstration 
Waiver, Texas Women's Health Program 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Texas Women~· Health Waiver] 
https:/ /\VVl'W.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics1Waivers/ 1115/ 
dov11nloads/tx1Womens-Health-\Vaiver/tx-womens-health-waiver-research-demo-waiver. pdf 
23 See Texas Womens Health Waiver, supra note 22, at 3. 
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funded program.25 As a result, federal funding ended on December 31, 2012, and the 
state began an entirely self-funded replacement. 26 
Texas initially sought to renew the waiver for an additional year rather than allow the 
Expenditure Authority to expire.27 However, the extension requests sought to alter the 
Waiver by requesting that the Secretary also waive the free choice provision to allow the 
state to ban abortion providers from holding contracts under the Waiver.28 Though Texas 
requested a waiver of the provision "to the extent necessary," the state maintained that 
its proposal did not violate the provision, and therefore waiver was unnecessary.29 Texas 
sought to implement Human Resources Code § 32.024(c-l), which targeted entities 
contracting to provide care under family planning Waivers.30 Under the provision, 
providers were ineligible to participate in the Waiver if their practice included abortion 
care.31 Accordingly, the Secretary of HHS would not authorize the waiver renewal 
because the free choice provision was not likely to promote the objectives of the Act as 
required under§ 1115.32 
a. The Texas Human Resources Code and Abortion-Providing Entities 
When Texas applied for the 2007 Waiver, the state law that authorized Texas Health and 
Human Services Commission to seek the Waiver dictated that "money spent under the 
demonstration project, regardless of the funding source, [may] not [be] used to perform 
or promote elective abortions. The department . . . may not contract with entities 
that perform or promote elective abortions or are affiliates of entities that perform or 
promote elective abortions."33 The previously proposed language only barred Waiver 
funds from being used to perform elective abortions, which was consistent with federal 
25 See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of the Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Billy Millwee, 
Assoc. Comm'r for Medicaid & CHIP, Health & Human Servs. Comm'n (Mar. 15, 2012) 
[hereinafter March Mann to Millwee]; see also Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of 
the Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicare Servs., to Billy Millwee, 
Assoc. Comm'r for Medicaid & CHIP, Health & Human Servs. Comm'n (Dec. 12, 20 l l) 
[hereinafter December A1ann to A1illwee] https://senatorjoserodriguez.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/03/CMS-Letter-to-HHSC-re-WHP 12.12.2011.pdf 
26 See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., US. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., to Kay Ghahremani, Comm'r, Tex. Medicaid & CHIP (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter 
Mann to 1vlillwee]. 
27 See Texas Health and Human Services Commission, 11 lS(a) Research and Demonstration 
Waiver: Texas Women's Health Program (20 l l) (requesting renewal of the expenditure authority 





30 Tex. Hum Res. Code§ 32.024(c-l) (2017). 
31 Id 
32 See supra, December Mann to A1illwee. 
33 See S. 747, 79th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2005), https://capitoLtexas.gov/tlodocs/79Rlbilltext/pdf/ 
SB00747Fpdf#navpanes=O. 
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Medicaid policy restricting the use of federal funds to pay for abortions.34 This policy 
takes form in an annual appropriations rider, known as the Hyde Amendment, which 
is an amendment to the appropriations bill that restricts the use of the appropriated 
funds. 35 The legislation now exists in renewed form as § 32.024(c-l) of the Human 
Resources Code.36 
While the contract ban was part of Texas law and the Waiver applications at both initial 
authorization and renewal application, Planned Parenthood clinics not performing 
abortions participated in the Waiver despite being legally affiliated with Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America.37 Planned Parenthood clinics participated in the 
Waiver with the understanding that clinics remained eligible as long as the participating 
clinic did not recommend elective abortion to Waiver patients and maintained a 
separate legal identity from the Planned Parenthood clinics that provide or recommend 
abortion.38 By 2011, when the Waiver was due to expire, Planned Parenthood clinics 
were providing nearly half of the care covered by the Waiver. 39 During that time, Planned 
Parenthood was amidst the first of two "undercover" video campaigns and budget 
fights on Capitol Hill, which drew a critical eye to the organization's participation in 
public health care programs.40 
b. Texas v. Sebelius 
When negotiations to renew the Waiver with the contract ban resulted in the termination 
of the Waiver by CMS, Texas filed suit.41 Texas claimed that the 2007 waiver had 
identical restrictions on participation of abortion providers despite Planned Parenthood 
affiliates holding contracts to provide care under the Waiver.42 The 2007 application 
included a statement that abortion providers and affiliates would not be permitted to 
obtain provider contracts.43 Contrary to the state's position, the Waiver Expenditure 
34 Id 
35 See Neal Devins, Riders, WM. & MARY 66-67 (1994), 
wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2679&context=facpubs; see also The and 
Services, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.kff.org/womens-
health-policy/perspective/the-hyde-amendment-and-coverage-for-abortion-services/. 
36 See Tex. Hum. Res. Code§ 32.024(c-1) (2017). 
37 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo County Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343, 34 7 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that Planned Parenthood Federation of America operates clinics that 
abortion services and engage in abortion rights advocacy). 
38 See id. 
Texas v. Sebelius \W.D. Tex. 2012) (Case No. 6: 12-cv-62); see also Peter Shin et 
Potential Impact s on Access to 
Low-income Women, RCHN CrnvIMUNITY HEALTH FOUNDATION RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE 
(May4, 2012), 
40 See Erik Eckholm, 
2011 ), https://vv\vw.n;iimes.com/20 l l/02/l 8/us/politics/18parenthood.html 
41 See Complaint at 1, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62). 
42 See id at~ 11; see also Shin, supra note 39. 
43 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Texas Women's Health Section 1115 Demonstration 
Waiver Application (Dec. 28, 2005) (explaining that Texas's 2005 Waiver application references 
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Authority was not the blanket grant Texas requested, but instead an itemized list of 
waived requirements that did not include the free choice provision.44 
Texas's complaint asserted the state did not need CMS to waive compliance with the free 
choice provision because federal law only required that a state guarantee choice among 
qualified providers, and the effect of the Texas provision was that abortion providers 
were not qualified to provide care financed by Medicaid.45 The state also argued that 
barring abortion providers from providing Medicaid services only furthered federal 
Medicaid policy objectives. Since Congress had long forbidden the use of federal funds 
to pay for abortions except in narrow circumstances, the provision only promoted the 
objectives of the act.46 The state claimed that neither Texas nor the federal government 
should indirectly subsidize abortion providers with Medicaid funds.47 Finally, the state 
argued that the Secretary's refusal to waive the free choice provision and subsequent 
termination of the Waiver was an unlawful attempt to coerce Texas into repealing or 
not enforcing Human Resources Code § 32.024(c-l), therefore violating the Tenth 
Amendment.48 Following a denial of Texas's request for preliminary injunction, the suit 
was dismissed without prejudice.49 When federal funding ended in December 2012, 
Texas began implementing a fully state funded program. 
c. Texas's Self-Funded "Fix" 
Following the expiration of Texas's waiver, the state began to self-fund an equivalent 
family planning program on its own terms.50 Since federal funding ended in December 
the contract ban, in the "Eligible Providers" section, but does not request the waiver of any specific 
provisions in order to effectuate the ban). 
44 See Texas Expenditure Authority, supra note 19, at 11 (explaining that the expenditme authority 
denotes subsections of§ 1902 as opposed to§ 1396a, and that§ 1902 is the sectionnmnberwithin 
the Social Security Act that correlates to the same provisions as codified at 42 US.C. § 1396a). 
45 See Complaint at 6, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at iJ 31; see also Alina Salganicoff et al., The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for 
Abortion Services, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Oct. 16, 2017) (explaining that states may use their uwn 
funds to provide abortion coverage through Medicaid without federal fund matching; nineteen states 
currently do so), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/perspective/the-hyde-amendment-and-
coverage-for-abortion-services. 
48 See P Mot. Smn. J. at 27, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (Case No. 6:12-cv-62). But see 
Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "legislative scheme, with its 
mandatory language and detailed requirements, evidences a clear Congressional intent to take 
certain decisions away from state officials ... federalism argmnents have less weight in the context 
of a waiver of a congressional requirement. \Ve are not examining the Secretary's authority to 
interfere with state official's discretion, but rather her authority to waive compliance with federal 
statutes.") (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 US. 397, 417 (1970)). 
49 See Order of Dismissal, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2013) (Case No. 6: 12-cv-62); see also 
Jordan Smith, State Cannot Ban Planned Parenthood and Keep Federal Funds for Womens 
Health Program, THE AusnN CHRONICLE, (Dec. 22, 2012), https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/ 
news/2012-12-22/state-cannot-ban-planned-parenthood-and-keep-federal- funds-for-whp/. 
50 See Stacey Pogue, Excluding Planned Parenthood Has Been Terrible for Texas Women, 
Center for Public Policy Priorities 1, 2 (2017), https:/ /forabettertexas.org/in1ages/HW _2017 _08_ 
PlannedParenthoodExclusion.pdf. 
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2012, the program has been funded by a variety of sources under several different 
names.51 There have been two major obstacles in addition to the exclusion of abortion 
providers: first, the state severely underfunded the program in its first years; second, it 
implemented a tiered provider system that strongly disfavored provider practices that 
were dedicated to reproductive health care.52 Since federal funding was terminated, 
emollment across equivalent programs in Texas has reduced by 29% with a 39% 
reduction in access to care and a 41 % decrease in access to contraception as compared 
to the end of the federally funded program.53 
The self-funded programs reduced utilization of highly effective long-acting reversible 
contraceptives (LARCs) and injectable contraceptives, which resulted in higher rates of 
unintended pregnancy among beneficiaries.54 Researchers found the decrease in LARC 
utilization was not correlated with the longer effective-life of these contraceptives, which 
indicates that decreased usage correlates with decreased availability.55 Unintended 
pregnancy rates increased in the areas that lost coverage through Planned Parenthood 
affiliates, but continued to decline in the areas that never had a Planned Parenthood 
affiliate.56 This disruption indicates that the removal of Planned Parenthood was a 
cause of decreased access to and continuity of services, especially in communities 
without family planning providers.57 Texas published inaccurate information and data 
about providers in the state funded program.58 Texas claimed to have had 4,012 unique 
51 See MaryBeth Musmneci et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: A Look at the 
Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Sept. 20, 2018), https:// 
'Nww.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-a-look-at-the-
cmrent-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/. 
52 See Kinsey Hasstedt & Adam Sonfield, At It Again: Texas Continues to Undercut Access to 
Reproductive Health Care, GuTTMACHER INST. 1(July18, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/ 
article/2017 /07 /it-again-texas-continues-undercut-access-reproductive-health-care. 
53 See Stacey Pogue, Excluding Planned Parenthood has been Terrible for Texas Women, 
Center for Public Policy Priorities (2017), https:/ /forabettertexas.org/images/HW _2017 _08_ 
PlannedParenthoodExclusion.pdf. 
54 See Kari \Vhite et al., The Impact of Reproductive Health Legislation on Family Planning 
Clinic Services in Texas, 105 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 851, 851 (2015) (explaining that before federal 
funding ended in 2011, 71 % of participating providers offered LARCs, and in 2013 only 46% of 
participating providers offered LARCs, since decreased funding made the high up-front costs of 
LARCs prohibitive); see also Amanda J. Stevenson et al., Effect of Removal of Planned Parenthood 
from the Texas Womens Health Program, 374 N. ENGL. J. MED. 853, 853 (2016) (showing a relative 
reduction of 35.5% in long-acting reversible contraceptives and 31.3% for injectable contraceptives). 
55 See \Vhite et al., supra note 54, at 854 (discussing that decreased availability seems to be 
affected by both provider exclusion and tiering and the high up-front costs of LARCs, exacerbated 
by the fact that disfavored providers lost eligibility for rebated pharmaceutical prices. Excluded and 
lower-tier providers are also more likely to have experience in administering LARCs, and therefore 
the exclusions and tearing not only decreased availability of the pharmaceuticals themselves, but of 
participating providers who can administer them). 
56 See Stevenson et al., supra note 54, at 858 
57 See Stevenson et al., supra note 54, at 853-860. 
58 See NARAL Pro-Choice Texas, 2015 TEXAS WOMEN'S HEALTH PROGRAM REPORT (2015), https:// 
\'l'ww.scribd.com/ document/260127216/2015-NARA.L-TX-TWHP-Study. 
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providers emolled in the self-funded program at the end of Fiscal Year 2014.59 However, 
a spot-check investigation by NARAL Pro-Choice Texas of 681 listings revealed only 
236 unique "providers," and only 17% of those listings were practices that provided 
routine genealogical preventative services.60 
In October 2018, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission terminated the 
contracts of an organization called the Heidi Group, which repeatedly received among 
the largest contracts in the program while repeatedly failing to meet service goals.61 
The Heidi Group estimated that it could serve 50,000 beneficiaries of the state-funded 
program in fiscal year 2017, but ended up serving less than 2,500.62 Even though the 
group also failed to meet service goals in 2018, its contracts were renewed for fiscal year 
2019 before being terminated. 63 
d. Healthy Texas Women 
In June 201 7, Texas filed a new request for a § 1115 Waiver with CMS entitled "Healthy 
Texas Women."64 The new Waiver request is substantively the same as the terminated 
waiver, and references the provider ban, which is now permanent state law.65 The 
proposed Waiver would increase the income cutoff from 185% of the federal poverty 
line to 200%.66 Minors were not eligible to receive benefits under the terminated Waiver, 
but the new Waiver would allow minors fifteen and older to receive benefits if a parent 
applies on her behalf. 67 The new Waiver would cover the same benefits as the terminated 
Waiver.68 If the Waiver is granted, beneficiaries will automatically transfer into the 
Waiver population. 69 Texas proposed that the Waiver become effective September 1, 
2018, for a five year period ending August 31, 2023. 70 Though this start date has passed, 
s9 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Marissa Evans, State Cancels Health Contracts With Anti-Abortion Heidi 
TruBUNE (Oct. 12, 2018), 
anti-abortion-heidi-group/; see also Novack, Texas Anti-Abortion 
Promised to Serve 70,000 Women: It Served 3,300, THE TEXAS OBSERVER (Sep. 26, 2018), https:// 
v..rvvw.texasobserver.org/texas-anti-abortion-family-planning-group-promised-to-serve-70000-
women-it-served-3300. 
62 See Novack, supra note 61. 
63 See id. 
64 Healthy Texas Women Section Il 15 Demonstration rrutv"r .1-1.µp1:tr..:cfltun, Texas Health and Human 
Services Commission (June 30, 2017) [hereinafter Texas 
65 Texas 2017, supra note 64, with Texas Womens Health Waiver§ 
1115 Research and Demonstration Waiver, Texas Health and Human Services Commission (Dec. 
28, 2005) [hereinafter Texas Demonstration Waiver 2005]. 
66 See Texas 2017, supra note 64, at 10. 
67 Id. 
68 
69 See Texas 
10 Id. 
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CMS has not denied the Waiver and it could potentially be approved with a later start 
date agreed upon by Texas and CMS.71 
III.A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID FAMILY PLANNING POLICY 
States offer Medicaid family planning benefits in three modalities to serve several 
population groups. Full Medicaid beneficiaries receive family planning benefits as part 
of their mandatory benefits package.72 States may also expand the eligibility for family 
planning benefits in one of two ways: through either a§ 1115 Waiver program or a State 
Plan Amendment (SPA).73 
a. Mandatory Benefits 
Shortly after the Supreme Court held that all adults had a right to privacy in their use 
of contraceptives in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the SSA was amended in 1972 to make family 
planning services a standard Medicaid benefit. 74 The federal government pays 90% of 
the costs of family planning benefits instead of the regular Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP) rate for the jurisdiction, which distributes Medicaid costs between 
the state and federal governments according to a formula that compares per capita 
income in the state to nationwide per capita income.75 FMAP rates currently vary from 
50%, the minimum set by federal law, to 76%.76 For the beneficiaries who receive full 
Medicaid, family planning benefits are just one of the many categories of coverage they 
have access to as members of a traditional coverage population. Benefit design, which 
describes what services are covered and eligibility by age and gender, varies from state 
to state.77 
71 See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, MISER 
FAM. FouND. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://wwwJcfforg/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-
approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state. 
72 42 U.S.C. § l396d(a)(4)(C) (2012). 
73 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, § 2303 (2010); see also Usha 
Ranji et al., Medicaid and Family Planning: Background and Implications MISER FAM. 
FouND. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-family-planning-medicaid-
family-planning-policy. 
74 See Social Security Act, Pub. Law No. 92-603, § 299E, 86 Stat. 1329, 1462-63 (1972), codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (2012); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding 
that the privacy interest in the use of contraceptives protected by the Court's decision in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), could not be limited to married couples under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
75 See 42 U.S.C. §1396b(a)(5) (2012) (showing the federal government pays 90% of costs of 
care and 50% of administrative costs); see also Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance 
Expenditures, 80 Fed. Reg. 73779 (proposed Nov. 25, 2015). 
76 See Federal ~Medical Assistance Percentage and Multiplier, MISER FAM. 
FOUND. (2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier/? 
currentTimeframe=O&sortModel=%7B%22colid%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22 
%7D. 
77 See Minors 'Access to Contraceptive Services, GurrMACHER INST. 1 (2018), https://www. 
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-services; see also Payment 
and Coverage for the Prevention Transmitted Infections (ST!s), KAISER FAM. FouND. 
Qualified: Medicaid Provider Agreements, Waivers, 
and the Politics of Planned Parenthood 
39 
b. Section 1115 Waivers 
For over twenty years, CMS has allowed states to extend family planning benefits to 
individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid, but whose incomes would make them 
categorically eligible if they were pregnant. 78 To create these programs, the Secretary 
authorizes discretionary waivers of Medicaid requirements under § 1115 of the SSA. 
Waived provisions typically include the amount, duration, the scope of services 
requirement, 79 the EPSDT requirement, 80 the retroactive coverage provision, 81 and 
the prospective payment provisions. 82 Expenditure Authorities for Waiver programs 
dictate that for a specified period, expenditures under the Waiver will be regarded as 
regular expenditures under the state's Medicaid plan and unwaived provisions of the 
SSA still apply. 83 
Section 1115 allows the Secretary to waive compliance with various requirements of the 
Social Security Act, including federal Medicaid law, for the purposes of "experimental, 
pilot, or demonstration project[s]" when the Secretary believes authorizing a waiver "is 
likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of the Act. 84 Section 1115 has also been 
used to promote a variety of Medicaid objectives including delivery system reform 
and authorizing modified Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
Additionally, Waivers authorize coverage for services not authorized by the SSA, such 
as behavioral health and long-term care.85 
CMS 's longstanding policy is that Waiver programs are budget neutral, meaning they 
do not increase federal expenditures when compared to the state's Medicaid program 
1 (2017), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/payment-and-coverage-for-the-
prevention-of-sexually-transmitted-infections-stis/. 
78 See Usha Ranji et al., lvfedicaid and Family Planning: Background and Implications of the 
ACA, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://wv:w.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-family-
planning-medicaid-family-planning-policy. 
79 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2012) (providing that all Medicaid beneficiaries shall be eligible for 
the same amount, duration, and scope of services). 
80 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(43)(A) (stating that early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment 
benefits are targeted at Medicaid beneficiaries under the age of twenty-one to screen for and treat 
physical, mental, developmental, dental, hearing, and vision problems and delays). 
81 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (stating that retroactive coverage allows for coverage of services 
rendered up to three months before the beneficiary submits an application for Medicaid and is 
generally intended to ensure that providers administer medically necessary care when a Medicaid-
eligible patient presents for it, even if the patient does not currently have Medicaid). 
82 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(15) (requiring that the Prospective Payment system establishes 
reimbursement levels and systems that apply to traditional Medicaid, which are waived to allow the 
states to compensate family planning providers solely for those services). 
83 See Texas Expenditure Authority, supra note 19. 
84 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). 
85 See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Section 1115 i\1edicaid Demonstration Waivers: A Look at the 
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without the Waiver. 86 Family planning waivers are approved and funded on the principle 
that providing contraceptive coverage to women who would be eligible for Medicaid 
pregnancy coverage reduces Medicaid-covered pregnancies and births, which are more 
costly than family planning programs. 87 
c. State Plan Amendments 
The ACA allowed states to amend their state Medicaid plans to permanently incorporate 
expanded family planning programs. 88 Instead of using the Waiver authority, which 
requires evaluation as demonstrations and periodic renewal, states can create a 
permanent eligibility category for the population served through the Waivers. 89 Fifteen 
states have obtained SPAs, ten states continue to operate expanded family planning 
benefits as § 1115 demonstrations, and the remaining twenty-five states do not have 
expanded family planning benefits. 90 Only beneficiaries fully emolled in Medicaid have 
access to Medicaid family planning coverage.91 
IV. FREEDOM OF CHOICE: THE PROVISION PROTECTING 
ABORTION PROVIDERS AND THEIR MEDICAID PATIENTS 
The SSA requires states to allow Medicaid beneficiaries to access covered benefits 
from any qualified provider willing to administer care.92 Both the SSA and federal 
regulations pertaining to the provision show an intent to protect free choice in the family 
planning context, specifically beyond free choice for other medical care. 93 The free 
choice provision exempts family planning from managed care and beneficiaries must 
be allowed to obtain their family planning benefits from outside the network at no extra 
cost.94 While free choice can be waived to implement a managed care system, family 
planning benefits continue to operate outside of the managed care framework. 95 
Enforceability of individual Medicaid provisions by recipients is uncertain following 
the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, which narrowed the 
86 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Budget Form, nu1ps:11wvvV1r.m,emcaic1. 
gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/ 1115/ downloads/interiml 115-budget-
87 See Texas Women's Health Program Application (Dec. 28, 2005). 
88 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat 119, § 2303 (2010). 
89 supra note 19, with California Medicaid State Plan, State 
1 ~nnrov1e11 Mar. 24, 2011) permanent change to state's Medicaid 
Plan certain beneficiaries to access family planning benefits only). 
90 See Usha Ranji et aL, State Medicaid 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2009) 
passage of the Affordable Care Act, 24 states were operating 
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.corn/2013/01/8015.pdf 
91 See id 
92 42 US.C. § l 396a(a)(23)(A) (2012). 
93 42 US.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B); 42 C.ER § 431.51 (2012). 
94 42 US.C. § (2012). 
waivers), 
95 See 42 US.C. § 1396n (2012) the legal for the establislnnent ofMCOs, 
followed by subsection which exempts family plam1ing benefits from the waiver of free 
choice inherent in MCO arrangements). 
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circumstances under which a federal statute confers a private right of action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.96 In narrowing these circumstances, the Court declined to overturn 
previous precedent in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, which vested a §1983 
action in Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce rate-setting provisions, and left untouched 
the precedent in 0 'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, which held the free choice 
provision enforceable.97 
In 2017, following Gonzaga, the Eighth Circuit held in Does v. Gillespie that the free 
choice provision does not vest a§ 1983 cause of action in Medicaid beneficiaries.98 This 
holding allowed Arkansas to terminate Planned Parenthood of Arkansas and Eastern 
Oklahoma's Medicaid contracts without deciding whether the action violated the free 
choice provision. The court read the 0 'Bannon holding as a denial of any right vested in 
the free choice provision, but ultimately decided that the right had not been violated.99 
Additionally, the holding in Doe v. Gillespie departed from four other circuit courts 
and created the first significant circuit split since Gonzaga on the enforceability of a 
provision of Medicaid via a§ 1983 action. 100 
V. ELIMINATING ABORTION-PROVIDING FAMILY PLANNING 
PROVIDERS VIOLATES THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
Drawing on jurisprudence from the four circuit courts to substantively consider the 
state's power to define "qualified," Texas's state law contract ban violates the free choice 
provision and is therefore unenforceable in traditional Medicaid. States may not use 
the term "qualified" to make abortion providers categorically ineligible to participate in 
Medicaid. Although Texas claims it has an absolute power to do so without Waiver, its 
efforts to remove Planned Parenthood from traditional Medicaid counsel show otherwise. 
a. Defining "Qualified" 
In Texas v. Sebelius, Texas asserted the free choice provision did not conflict with the 
state's contract ban because the free choice provision protects beneficiaries' access to 
qualified providers and the contract ban merely dictated which providers are qualified, 
and were therefore eligible to enter into provider contracts. 101 Texas renewed these 
arguments in a pending application to obtain a new Waiver under substantially the same 
96 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 US. 273 (2002). 
97 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 US. 498, 524 (1990); see also O'Bannon v. Town Comi 
Ctr., 447 US. 773, 785 (1980). 
98 See Does v: 867 F3d 1034, 1046 
99 in the free choice did 
the state but 
enforcement of the at all). 
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conditions as the proposal that resulted in termination in 2012, anticipated by the change 
in administration. 102 
Appellate courts have repeatedly dismissed this argument, including in the Fifth 
Circuit. 103 In Rosado v. Wyman, the Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of 
states redefining terms that appear in the SSA by state legislative fiat to avoid an 
unsatisfactory application of federal law. 104 States have the power to set provider 
qualifications, and federal regulations allow states to set "reasonable standards" for 
providers. 105 However, this authority may not be used to transform the term "qualified" 
into "a Medicaid-specific term of art conferring upon the states plenary authority to 
withhold Medicaid funds on any policy grounds they prefer to pursue."106 "Qualified" 
must be given its plain meaning. The states' power to set qualifications in the Medicaid 
context is tied to the traditional power to police the practice of medicine within their 
borders. 107 Furthermore, the term is modified by the language immediately following: 
"to perform the service or services required."108 The Seventh Circuit found that the 
term "qualified" in this context unambiguously relates to the professional and clinical 
competence of providers. 109 
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits considered and found invalid contract bans 
mirroring Texas 's. 110 In Betlach, Arizona claimed that the free choice provision enabled 
states to exclude providers "for any reason supplied by state law," thus allowing the 
legislature to pass a state law excluding any provider for any reason. 111 Texas's defense 
of its contract ban in Texas v. Sebelius likewise makes this argument. 112 The Betlach 
102 See Healthy Texas Women Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver Application, TEx. HEALTH AND 
HuMAN SERVS. CoMM'N (Jun. 30, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1l15/downloads/tx/tx-healthy-women-pa.pdf. 
103 See Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
104 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 457 (1970) (holding that New York "may not redefine its 
standard of need in such a way that it skirts the requirement of re-evaluating its existing standard;" 
it was impermissible to define standard of need to avoid the responsibility to adjust it to changing 
costs ofliving). 
105 42 C.F.R. § 431.5 l(c)(2); see also Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Missouri v. Andersen, 
882 F.3d 1205, 1230 (10th Cir. 2018). 
106 See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2013). 
107 See Andersen, 882 F.3d at 1230; see also Gee, 862 F.3d at 465; Betlach, 727 F.3d at 969; see 
also Planned Parenthood oflnd., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 980 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Indiana, 699 F.3d at 978 (holding that the use of the 
term "reasonable" limits state power to define qualified to "pe1missible variations in the ordinary 
concept" of the term); see also Betlach, 727 F.3d at 969 (finding that "to perform the service or 
services required" modified "qualified"). 
109 Indiana, 699 F.3d at 978. 
110 See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 
Planned Parenthood Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r Ind. State Dep't Health, 699 F.3d 962, 980 (7th Cir. 2012). 
l J l Betlach, 727 F.3d at 969. 
112 See P Mot. Preliminary Inj. at 14-18, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62-WSS) 
(citing First Med. Health Plan, Inc. v. Vega-Ramos, 479 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (allowing Pue1io 
Rico to exclude from Medicare an insurer eligible to participate under federal law because their 
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Court found that in addition to defying the ordinary meaning of the term, to hold that 
Arizona could exclude providers for any reason at all would abrogate the duty to give 
meaning to every word of a statute and allow for the production of absurd results. 113 
Such a decision would permit states to undermine Medicaid beneficiaries' statutory 
rights by moving the term away from its meaning grounded in quality and competency 
of care and towards a mere dictate of contract eligibility. 
In Indiana, the state narrowed the claimed state power slightly, arguing that the state 
could exclude providers for any reason that furthers a legitimate state interest, and 
that preventing the "indirect subsidization of abortion" is a legitimate state interest, 
but the Seventh Circuit ultimately found this argument unpersuasive. 114 While the state 
suggested that a state law could not define qualified merely in order to target choice 
of providers, an interpretation of the statute that permits diminishing free choice for 
reasons unrelated to ability to provide care "inverts what the statute says."115 The 
court interpreted the state's action as an attempt to fashion a loophole in the law by 
labeling exclusionary rules "qualifications."116 The free choice provision does not 
protect beneficiaries' ability to choose between providers that the state finds politically 
unobjectionable, rather it protects the ability ofbeneficiaries to choose from all providers 
capable of and willing to provide care. 117 The Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Ninth 
Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit have held the state's power to qualify providers cannot 
be used to exclude clinics performing abortion when the practitioners are licensed to 
administer the covered care. 118 
b. Texas's Blocked Enforcement Action Against Texas 
Planned Parenthood Affiliates 
The Human Resources Code only imposes the provider restr1ct10ns on providers 
under the Waiver, but does not interfere with the ability of those entities to enter into 
provider contracts to provide care to beneficiaries in traditional Medicaid. 119 Texas 
initiated enforcement actions against Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas (PPGT) to 
invalidate contracts held under traditional Medicaid, but the Health and Human Services 
Commission was enjoined by the District Court for the Western District of Texas from 
part1c1pa1Jon would violate a Puerto Rico anti-kickback law since the free choice nrrivN.um does not 
in Puerto Rico). 
113 See Betlach, 727 F3d at 970 United States v. Menasche, 348 US. 528 (1955)). 




117 See id at 980. 
118 See Planned Paren1hood of Kan, & Mid-Missouri v. Andersen, 882 F3d 1205, 1229, 1246 
Cir. 2018); see also Plalllled Parenthood Golf Coast, Inc., v. Gee, 862 F3d 445, 465 Cir. 2017); 
see also Parenthood Ariz., lnc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 974 Cir. 2013); see alrn Planned 
Parenthood of Ind. v. Cornm'r Ind. State Dep't Health, 699 F3d 962, 980 Cir. 2012). 
119 TEx. HuMAN RES. CcmE § 32.024(c-l). 
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terminating the provider agreements held by PPGT affiliate clinics. 120 Although Texas 
claims that it does not violate the free choice provision to bar abortion providers and 
their affiliates from Medicaid, it has not attempted to pass a law paralleling Human 
Resources Code§ 32.024(c-l). 121 
In Betlach, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the difference between excluding an 
individual provider on account of improper or illegal conduct and banning an entire 
class of providers "on the ground that their scope of practice includes certain perfectly 
legal medical procedures."122 The Fifth Circuit applied this principle in Gee, and while 
Louisiana argued Planned Parenthood was unqualified to provide care covered by 
Medicaid, the state conceded that the terminated clinics were clinically competent. 123 
The Inspector General of the Commission for Texas initially sent a letter to PPGT in 
October 2015 informing PPGT that their provider agreements were being terminated 
for alleged crimes and program violations. 124 No action was taken until over a year 
later, when the state sent out another termination notice in December 2016. 125 The 
termination letter alleged that an investigation revealed Planned Parenthood received 
illegal payments for fetal tissue and altered procedures for the purpose of obtaining 
tissue to sell, which was a practice that violated generally accepted medical standards. 126 
The district court, however, found that the Inspector General had no factual basis for 
terminating the provider agreements. 127 As a result, the court concluded that PPGT 
could not lawfully be excluded from Medicaid, because the Inspector General had not 
proven that PPGT clinics were unqualified to provide the covered services. 128 
Although Texas alleges that § 32.024( c-1) is compatible with the free choice provision, 
and that federal law does not bar the state from removing Planned Parenthood from 
Medicaid, the law Texas has passed to that effect applies only to programs requiring 
additional federal approval. 129 Instead of passing a state law that would de facto 
disqualify Planned Parenthood across all Medicaid programing, the state brought an 
enforcement action against one of the Planned Parenthood entities that provides care to 
120 Plam1ed Parenthood Greater Tex. 
Supp. 3d 974, 1000 (WD. Tex. 2017). 
& Preventative Health Servs. v. Smith, 236 F 
121 See Texas Women :5 Health TEx. HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS. 
CoMM'N (2011); see also Texas Women Section 1115 Demonstration 
TEx. HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS. CoMM'N (Jun. 30, 2017) that Texas maintained that their 
contract ba:n does not nm afoul of the free choice the 
waiver). 
122 See Plam1ed Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 973 Cir. 2013). 
123 See Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F3d 445, 460, 466 
124 See Smith, 236 F Supp. 3d at 984-86. 
125 See id 
126 Id 
Id at 990. 
128 See Planned Parenthood Greater Tex. 
236 F Supp. 3d 974, 990 (WD. Tex. 2017). 
129 See TEx. HuMAN RES. CODE§ 32.024(c-1). 
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traditional Medicaid beneficiaries. 130 The state did not claim the power to debar Planned 
Parenthood on the mere basis of policy, but rather attempted to make a case out of 
affirmative wrongdoing by the clinic. 131 
VI. FREE CHOICE MAY NOT BE WAIVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
EXCLUDING ABORTION PROVIDERS 
a. Restrictions on Section 1115 Authority 
Texas's proposed action, if permitted by HHS, would be reviewed under the APA, 
because it would be an action by a federal administrative agency. 132 Administrative 
decisions by departments of the federal government are subject to judicial review under 
the APA, except where review has been proscribed by statute or the action is "committed 
to agency discretion."133 The APA provides that a court shall set aside any agency action 
that is "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion ... or not in accordance with 
law."134 While administrative decisions are entitled to a "presumption of regularity," a 
court considering an APA challenge must engage in a "substantial inquiry" that goes 
beyond whether the administrative action was within the scope of statutory authority. 135 
A substantial inquiry includes determining whether the decision gave due consideration 
to the relevant factors and screening for clear errors in judgement.136 As a result, a 
decision would be held to violate the APA if the agency: 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs contrary to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise. 137 
The Supreme Court has never considered an APA challenge to the grant of a § 1115 
Waiver, but several Circuit Court of Appeals and U.S. District Courts have interpreted 
the Court's APA jurisprudence in reviewing the Secretary's authority to authorize 
Waivers. 138 Some courts have explicitly held that review of experimental programs is 
inherently narrower than the administrative actions at issue in the Supreme Court's APA 
130 See Smith, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 984-86. 
131 See id. 
132 See e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1066 of1he § 1115 
Waiver under the APA); see also C. K. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 
Cir. 1996); see also Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101 Cir. 1973). 
133 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1971) Section 701 of 
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1964 ed., Supp. V)). 
134 APA, 5 US.C. § 706(2)(A). 
135 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
136 Id. 
401 U.S. 402, 415. (1971). 
137 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). 
138 See C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 181 Cir. 1996); see 
also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1076 Cir. 1994). But see Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 
1090 Cir. 1973). 
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jurisprudence.139 Each reviewing court has found that § 1115 Waivers are subject to 
APA review, but the circuit courts have diverging analyses and there is no binding § 
1115 jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit, which has jurisdiction over Texas. However, 
assuming the Fifth Circuit would find the grant of§ 1115 Waivers subject to APA 
review, Texas's Waiver request would not withstand APA review since it does not meet 
any of the three elements of§ 1115. The Ninth Circuit in Beno v. Shala/a took the 
most expansive reading of the Waiver provision, finding each of the three elements of§ 
1115 as binding on the Secretary to grant or deny waiver requests. 140 Two other Circuits 
interpreting the law found some, but not all, of these requirements binding. 141 The U.S. 
District Courts are similarly mixed. 142 
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits found the "likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives of the [Social Security] Act" language ("objectives requirement") binding 
upon the Secretary. 143 This language requires that the Secretary consider the impact of 
the project on the people whom the underlying program was intended to benefit, and is 
the element most likely to be found binding on the Secretary in the event that a grant of 
Texas's request is reviewed in federal court. 144 
Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgement for that of the agencies in APA 
review of decision-making and should refrain from "comment[ing] on the wisdom 
of" agency decision-making. 145 However, the Secretary must have a rational basis for 
determining that the approved Waiver is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of 
the Act. 146 Medicaid's stated objectives are 
to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children 
and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources 
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) 
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or 
retain capability for independence or self-care. 147 
While the Secretary has argued that Medicaid has more nuanced objectives that afford 
him more discretion, the District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.) has held 
that these objectives are considered primary. 148 The Secretary may not pursue other 
139 473 F.2d at 1103; see also C.K., 92 F.3d at 182 Overton as an of 
how difficult it is to review outside of traditional review of administrative action). 
l4o See Beno, 30 F.3d at 1066. 
141 See C.K., 92 F.3d at 183; see 473 F.2d at 1105. 
142 See Stewartv.Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d237, 271(D.D.C.2018) all three elements 
----···-·-,,,,see also Crane Matthews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1976) the 
143 See C.K., 92 F.3d at 184; see also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, l 069 Cir. 1994); see also 
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1l05 Cir. 1973). 
144 See Beno, 30 F.3d at l 070. 
145 See CK, 92 F.3d at 180-81. 
146 Id at 181. 
147 42 US.C. § 1396-1 (2018) for the Medicaid program). 
148 See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 271 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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objectives of the program at the expense of the coverage goals explicitly set out in the 
statutory language. 149 The Ninth Circuit also found binding the "to the extent and for 
the period she finds necessary" language (hereafter "extent and period requirement"). 150 
However, objections to the Waiver in Beno did not address the extent and period 
requirement, and thus the court did not resolve the "precise meaning" of the extent and 
period language. 151 
The Third Circuit and the D.D.C. found the extent and period requirement binding, 
unlike the Second Circuit. 152 In CK., the Third Circuit considered a challenge to the 
extent of the waiver where plaintiffs alleged that it was unnecessary to incorporate 
nearly the entire population of beneficiaries into the experimental waiver and that it 
failed to make certain exceptions in applying the wavier to individual beneficiaries. 153 
The plaintiffs in CK. alleged that the Secretary should only have allowed the state to 
apply the terms of the Waiver to a small group of beneficiaries, while leaving others with 
standard benefits. 154 While the Aguayo and Beno courts held that the Secretary does 
not have to grant the Waiver request exactly as she receives it and that alterations of the 
Waiver are within her discretion, the court in CK. found that the Secretary did not abuse 
her discretion by granting the proposed Waiver statewide. 155 
The D.D.C. held that Kentucky could not "piggyback" waivers onto a project where 
those waivers were not necessary to achieve the program's goals. 156 Kentucky 
proposed a program targeting the Medicaid expansion population by adding eligibility 
requirements and cost-sharing provisions. 157 The D.D.C. held that the eligibility and 
cost-sharing elements were not necessary to the functioning of the substance abuse 
program, and therefore those elements were struck down while the substance abuse 
program remained intact. 158 
Lastly, examining the "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project" language 
("demonstration requirement"), the Ninth Circuit in Beno held that § 1115 Waivers may 
simply to "enable states to save money or to evade federal requirements" but must "test 
out new ideas and ways of dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients."159 
On this theory, a "simple benefits cut" to reduce spending on cash welfare recipients did 
149 Id 
150 Beno v. Shalala, 30 F3d 1057, 1071 Cir. 1994). 
151 See id at 1072. 
152 See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F Supp. 3d 237, 245 (D.D.C. 2018); see also C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't 
of Health & Hrnnan Servs., 92 F3d 171, l 83 Cir. l 996); see also Aguayo v. Richardson, 4 73 
F2d 1090, 1105 Cir. 1973). 
153 See C.K., 92 F.3d at 186. 
154 Id 
155 See CK v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F3d 171, 186-87 Cir. 1996); 
see also Beno v: Shalala, 30 F3d 1057, 1069 Cir. 1994); 473 F2d at 1103 n.21. 
156 See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F Supp. 3d 237, 258 (D.D.C. 2018). 
157 See id. at 243. 
158 See id at 274. 
159 See Beno v. Shalala, 30 F3d 1057, 1069 Cir. 1994). 
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not satisfy the demonstration requirement. 160 Neither the Third Circuit in CK. nor the 
Second Circuit in Aguayo found the demonstration requirement binding. 161 The D.D.C. 
adopted Beno s analysis on the demonstration requirement, but noted an incidental loss 
of coverage for some beneficiaries is not enough to violate the requirement. 162 The 
objectives requirement is the element of§ 1115 most likely to be considered controlling 
if Texas's proposed Waiver were granted and challenged in federal court. The extent and 
period and demonstration requirements have found less broad acceptance in the courts 
but may still be binding. 
b. The Proposed Waiver of Section 1396a is Beyond the Scope of the Secretary's 
Discretionary Authority 
Not only does Texas's proposed Waiver fail to meet the requirements of§ 1115 on its 
face, but Texas's self-funded program also undermines its claim to the contrary. The 
proposed Waiver would not meet any of the binding requirements set out by the court 
in Beno and would therefore also fail the tests set forth by both CK. and Aguayo. To 
grant the Waiver would be beyond the scope of the Secretary's authority, and such action 
would be subject to reversal as a violation of the APA. 163 
Significantly, the Waiver request fails the objectives requirement, which every reviewing 
circuit court has found binding. 164 The Waiver does not further the objectives of the act 
to ban the targeted providers from Medicaid, since reducing the "indirect subsidization 
of abortion" is not an objective ofMedicaid. 165 There is no rational connection between 
furthering the actual objectives of the Act and barring politically disfavored providers 
from the program. 166 
While there may be other objectives found in the statutory text establishing the Medicaid 
program, such as improving health outcomes for beneficiaries, the furnishing of covered 
services to the beneficiary population is the primary objective. 167 To the extent that 
160 See U.S. Department and Human Services, Aid to Families with veoerwe.ru 
Children (AFDC) and Families (TANF): Overview (Nov: 30, 
2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/aid-families-dependent-children-afdc-and-temporary-assistance-needy-
families-tanf-overview-0. 
161 See C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Hrnnan Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 183 Cir. 1996) 
central question before us is whether the record disclosed that the Secretary rationally could 
have determined that (1) New Jersey's program was to assist in promoting the 
of AFDC, and (2) it was necessary to waive to the extent and for the she did to 
enable New Jersey to carry out its experiment."); see also Aguayo v. Richardson, 4 73 F.2d 1090, 
1105 Cir. 1973) limitation, and the limitation on the Secretary was that he 
must judge the project to be the objectives' of the designated parts of 
the [SSA]."). 
162 See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 270 (D.D.C. 2018). 
163 See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2012). 
164 See C.K., 92 F.3d at 183; see 473 F.2d at 1105. 
165 See Planned Parenthood ofind. v. Comm'r Ind. State Dep't Heahh, 699 F.3d 962, 978 Cir. 
2012). 
166 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012). 
167 See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 260-61 (D.D.C. Jnne 29, 2018) (rejecting the 
Secretary's argrnnent that a Waiver to result in substantial coverage loss still furthered the 
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Texas's anti-abortion policy goals and the Hyde Amendment result in reducing public 
funding available to abortion providers, the goal is null if it runs contrary to the explicit 
statutory purpose of providing coverage. 
Further, Texas's program proves not only the failure to meet the objectives requirement, 
but an abdication of those objectives in the name of political priorities. While waiving 
free choice may not affect the objectives, the Waiver itself could not be authorized 
under the statute because § 1115 requires programs to improve Medicaid. 168 Beyond 
any impact-neutral fac;ade lies the results of the experiment that Texas has conducted 
on its own dime. The provider ban undermines the ability of Medicaid family planning 
to achieve its goals by impeding not just choice, but access, leading to outcomes worse 
than those of the program in which the free choice provision did apply. 169 Texas's state-
funded program performs poorly across all meaningful measures: emollment numbers 
are down, fewer services are being administered, some beneficiaries are unable to 
access their preferred contraceptive method, and the rate of unintended pregnancy in 
the beneficiary population has increased. 170 These effects are concentrated in areas that 
have lost access to care from providers who also perform elective abortions. 171 
A waiver of free choice that has no effect on programmatic integrity would not meet 
the objective requirements of Medicaid. Likewise, it does not follow that approving 
the Waiver would increase access to Medicaid family planning. The Waiver request 
would automatically furtherthe objectives of the Act and the evidence from Texas's self-
funded program suggests the request would undermine those objectives. Texas's Waiver 
request also does not meet the extent and period requirement. Because expanded family 
planning programs can operate with the free choice provision intact, the Waiver exceeds 
the requirements for a demonstration project to waive the provision. The D.D.C. held 
this requirement prevents the Secretary from "piggybacking" unacceptable waivers by 
attaching them to acceptable ones. 172 
When Texas filed suit to prevent the termination of federal funding under the Waiver, 
Texas alleged that the Secretary must find that the request promotes the objectives on a 
program-wide level, without parsing whether each element of the Waiver is necessary. 173 
Therefore, refusal to grant the entire waiver on the basis of finding that one part of the 
request was improper when the waiver on the whole might promote the objectives was 
an abuse of discretion. 174 However, the Second Circuit accepted, and the Ninth Circuit 
oh'"''t''""o because health outcomes were to the argument 
nh'<·•<•t,VPO of Medicaid differed for the traditional and vApuuowu fJU!Jli1'tuV11'). 
168 See C.K. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 184 
see also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, l 069 Cir. 1994) that a § 1115 Waiver must 
promote the of the Act); see also Aguayo Richardson, 473 F2d 1090, 1105 Cir. 
1973). 
169 See supra Part U.C. 
170 See supra notes 54-59. 
171 Stevenson et note 54, 853, 857. 
172 Stewart Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3<l 258 (D.D.C. June 29, 2018) 
173 See f' Mot. Sum. J. al 19-20, Texas v. Sebelius, No. 6: 12-cv-62 (WD. Tex. 2012). 
174 Id. 
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expanded upon the ability of the Secretary to grant Waivers in part or make certain parts 
of the grant conditional. 175 The Ninth Circuit in Beno held that the Secretary may reject 
a project or require a project to be modified for consistency with federal requirements, 
to mitigate potential harms, and to be more likely to further Medicaid's goals. 176 
The Secretary exercised this modification power when Texas requested a waiver of 
free choice in its application for renewal of the Texas Women's Health Waiver. 177 The 
Secretary notified the state Medicaid commissioner that waiver of the free choice 
provision did not meet the objectives requirement and therefore would not be granted. 178 
However, the Secretary did not outright deny renewal and terminate the Waiver. Instead, 
the Secretary granted an extension to allow CMS and the state to reach an agreement 
that only waived Medicaid requirements to the extent necessary to carry out the project, 
which Texas rejected. 179 Interpreting the extent and period requirement, the Second 
Circuit explicitly disapproved of shoehorning unnecessary and harmful Waiver criteria 
into an otherwise beneficial program. 180 If it is within the Secretary's power to "require 
the states to modify projects" it must be within his discretion to reject a proposal ifthe 
state refuses to modify their demonstration project. 181 
Additionally, family planning waivers lack demonstration or experimental value, given 
that§ 1115 has been used to expand family planning benefits for over twenty years. 182 
The ACA authorized states to make expanded family planning benefits a part of their 
permanent state Medicaid plans through a state plan amendment, and therefore the 
Waiver authority is no longer necessary to offer these benefits. 183 Even if family planning 
Waivers retain experimental value to pass the demonstration requirement, Texas has 
175 See Beno v. Shalala, 30 F3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir 1994); see also Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 
F2d 1090, 1103 n.21 (2d Cir. 1973). 
176 See Beno, 30 F.3d a1 1069. 
177 See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of the Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicare Servs., to Billy Millwee, Assoc. Comm'r for Medicaid & CHIP, Health & Human Servs. 
Comm'n (Dec. 12, 2011 ), https://senatorjoserodriguez.com/vvp-content/uploads/2012/03/CMS-
Letter-to-HHSC-re-WHP 12.12.2011.pdf. 
178 See id 
179 See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of the Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicare Servs., to Billy Millwee, Assoc. Comm'r for Medicaid & CHIP, Health & Human Servs. 
Comm'n (Mar. 15, 2012), https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/archive/2012/17970.pdf. 
180 See Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1071-72 (9th Cir 1994). 
181 See id at 1068-69. 
182 See Usha Ranji et al., Medicaid and Implications of the 
ACA, MISER FAM. FouND., at 4 (Feb. 3, 2016), https:/ivl'WW.kfforg/report-section/medicaid-and-
family-plarming-medicaid-family-plarming-policy/. 
183 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, § 2303 (2010); see also 
Planning Eligibility Expansions, GuTTMACHER INST. 1 (2017) (stating that in 
the year preceding the passage of the ACA, twenty-four states were operating family plarming 
waivers; currently, fifteen states have adopted state plan amendments and ten states are operating 
waivers), hltps://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medicaid-family-planning-eligibility-
ex;1ans10ns; see also State Medicaid J<ami ly Services: A 0wnmarv 
MISER FAM. FouND., at 5 (2009), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress. 
com/2013/01/8015.pdf. 
Qualified: Medicaid Provider Agreements, Waivers, 
and the Politics of Planned Parenthood 
51 
operated a self-funded program since 2013 that performs significantly worse than the 
Waiver program that preceded it. The experiment has been conducted on Texas's own 
dime and has failed. 184 There is no demonstrative value in supplying federal funding 
to a poorly performing program to allow the state to avoid complying with federal 
law. Texas's Waiver request fails to meet the legal criteria of a § 1115 Waiver under 
any test that could be applied by any combination of the potentially binding elements 
since it does not meet any of the three binding requirements. The requests following 
Texas's, made by Tennessee and South Carolina, would also fail any level of review for 
consistency with the requirements of§ 1115. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although Texas alleges that it is within its authority to bar abortion providers from its 
Medicaid program, Texas's attempts to effectuate this goal in traditional Medicaid and 
in expanded family planning services is to the contrary. Texas has been enjoined from 
terminating Planned Parenthood from participating in traditional Medicaid yet seeks a 
Waiver to enable the same result in expanded family planning services. CMS recently 
revoked guidance issued in 2016 emphasizing the effects of the free choice provision 
in the family planning context. 185 Regardless of the rescinded guidance, the free choice 
provision and related federal regulations remain in full force. 
Since the state cannot prove a programmatic violation that warrants barring abortion 
providers writ large from Medicaid and since states may not label abortion providers de 
facto unqualified to be Medicaid, Texas may not exclude providers absent a Waiver from 
CMS. Texas's proposal to obtain such a Waiver cannot meet the criteria for approval. 
Accordingly, the state may not use a law purporting to limit contract eligibility to limit 
beneficiary rights for political purposes either in traditional Medicaid or by Waiver. 
Texas's Waiver request must be denied, and if granted cannot surpass scrutiny under 
the APA. 
184 See Kari White et al., The Impact Health 
Clinic Services in Texas, 105 AM. J PuB. HEALTH 851, 1179-80 (2015) 1uu•vw1u""'"'1' 
of the Texas 'vfO""''"c'" 
185 See Letter from CMS Director Brian Neale to State Medicaid Directors, Re: Ke:scnu1111g 
#16-005 (Jan. 19, 2018), 
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